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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
John A. Judd appeals from the order of the district court denying his
request for post-conviction counsel and dismissing his petition for post-conviction
relief.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court set forth the factual and procedural background of Judd's
underlying criminal case and post-conviction proceeding as follows:
John A. Judd ("the Petitioner" or "Mr. Judd") entered a guilty
plea to one count of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR CHILD
UNDER SIXTEEN in violation of Idaho Code ("IC") § 18-6501(b).
On September 28, 1998, Mr. Judd was sentenced by this Court to a
fixed period of confinement of five (5) years and a subsequent
indeterminate period of ten (10) years, for a total of fifteen (15)
years. Thereafter, on April 20, 2000, the Petitioner filed a Motion
for Correction or Reduction of Sentence pursuant to Rule 35 of the
Idaho Criminal Rules ("ICR"). On or about January 5, 2001, this
Court denied that Rule 35 Motion as untimely. On March 20, 2007,
the Petitioner filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief, alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr. Judd based that claim on the
following grounds:
(a) Counsel failed to advise the court that he was a
minor at the time of the crime. Petitioner was 17
years old. (b) Counsel failed to appeal the sentence
witch [sic] was excessive and failed to file Rule #35
[sic] upon petitioners [sic] request. (c) Counsel failed
to advise the court of the conflict of interest. The
petitioners [sic] father was sentenced by Judge in
same type crime in 1985.
On April 6, 2007, this Court issued an Order denying Mr. Judd's
Petition for Post Conviction Relief, dismissing the same with
prejudice because the time for filing a Petition for Post Conviction
Relief had expired. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a Notice of
Appeal, and this Court then appointed the State Appellate Public
Defender's Office to represent Mr. Judd. On or about February 13,
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2008, the Respondent, State of Idaho, filed a Motion for Remand,
requesting "an order remanding this case to the district court and
an order staying the briefing schedule until after the district court's
final action on remand." Pursuant to that motion, the State argued
that because this Court did not provide the Petitioner with twenty
(20) days notice of its intent to dismiss as required by IC § 194906(b), this case should be remanded so that this Court could
provide such notice.
(Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08, pp.1-2 (internal citations omitted,
internal quotes verbatim).)
The Idaho Supreme Court remanded Judd's post-conviction case to the
district court, which issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and gave Judd twenty
days to respond.

(Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08.) According to the

district court, Judd thereafter filed an affidavit and motion for the appointment of
counsel, and a response to the dismissal notice. 1 (See Order, fifed 7/3/08, pp.12.) On July 3, 2008, the district court filed an order in which it: (1) stated that
Judd had filed an affidavit and motion "which this Court considered and herewith
DENIES the appointment of counsel," and (2) dismissed Judd's post-conviction
petition with prejudice because it was not filed timely and the court lacked
jurisdiction to consider Judd's claims. (Id., p.2.)
Judd appeals the denial of his motion for the appointment of counsel and
dismissal of his post-conviction petition. 2

1

The response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss has not been
made part of the record on appeal.
2
Although Judd's most recent (i.e., after remand) notice of appeal has not been
made a part of the record on appeal, such notice does not appear to have been
necessary in light of the fact that the original appeal was remanded to the district
court and the briefing schedule was stayed pending final action on remand.
(Order Granting Motion for Remand and Motion to Stay Briefing Schedule,
signed 3/19/08, filed with Idaho Supreme Court.)
2

ISSUE
Judd states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it failed to rule on Mr. Judd's motion
for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his post-conviction
petition?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Judd failed to meet his burden of establishing the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for appointment of counsel?
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ARGUMENT
Judd Has Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing That The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Appointed Counsel

A

Introduction
In the same written order, the district court both denied Judd's request for

the appointment of counsel and dismissed his post-conviction petition. (Order,
filed 7/3/08.) On appeal, Judd contends the district court erred in denying his
motion for appointed counsel in his post-conviction relief proceeding without first
determining whether to appoint counsel to assist him. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-9.)
There is no legal authority to support Judd's argument that the two rulings by the
district court could not be presented in the same order. 3 In any event, Judd's
post-conviction petition was plainly untimely; thus, he failed to raise the possibility
of a valid claim, and cannot show any harm in the denial of his motion for
appointed counsel. Given Judd's failure to raise the possibility of a valid claim,
he has failed to meet his burden of establishing that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his request for counsel.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to

represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to J.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary.
Plant v. State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007).

"In

reviewing the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction
3

Judd does not assert that the district court erred in denying his motion to
appoint counsel. Instead, Judd contends the timing of that ruling constituted
error because it was not made prior to (vis-a-vis, in the same order as) the
court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition.
4

proceedings, '[t]his Court will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous.

As to questions of law, this Court exercises free

review."' Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,792,102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004)
(quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 678, 23 P.3d 138, 140 (2001)).

C.

Applicable Legal Standards Under I.C. § 19-4904
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies

financially and "alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim that would
require further investigation on the defendant's behalf." Swader v. State, 143
Idaho 651, 654, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007); Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102
P.3d at 1112. As Swader instructs:
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial
court must do more than determine whether the petition alleges a
valid claim. The court must also consider whether circumstances
prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation
into the facts. An indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the
penitentiary would almost certainly be unable to conduct an
investigation into facts not already contained in the court record.
Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present sufficient
facts showing that his or her counsel's performance was deficient or
that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law.
Therefore, the trial court should appoint counsel if the petition
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim. The
investigation by counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint counsel
and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is appointed
are controlled by two different standards.
143 Idaho at 654-55, 152 P.3d at 15-16 (emphasis added).
When a motion for the appointment of counsel is presented, the abuse of
discretion standard as applied to I.C. § 19-4904, "permits the trial court to
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determine whether the facts alleged are such that they justify the appointment of
counsel; and, in determining whether to do so, every inference must run in the
petitioner's favor where the petitioner is unrepresented at that time and cannot be
expected to know how to properly allege the necessary facts." Charboneau, 140
Idaho at 793-94, 102 P.3d at 1112-13. If, on the other hand, the claims are so
patently frivolous that there appears no possibility that they could be developed
into a viable claim even with the assistance of counsel, the court may deny the
motion for counsel and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless
post-conviction petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798,
809 (2007); Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App.
2004).

D.

Judd Failed To Meet His Burden Of Establishing The District Court
Abused Its Discretion In Denying His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel

In order to be eligible for appointment of counsel, Judd's petition had to
present the possibility of a valid post-conviction claim. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at
793, 102 P.3d at 1112. Judd failed to do so, as the district court explained in its
Notice of Intent to Dismiss:
As explained, a conviction was entered against Petitioner on
September 28, 1998. He was allotted forty-two (42) days from that
date in which to file an appeal. The Petitioner took no action until
he filed his Rule 35 motion on April 20, 2000, nearly two full years
after entry of his conviction. This Court denied that motion on
January 5, 2001. His current Petition for Post Conviction Relief
was not filed until March 20, 2007, well beyond the one-year period
provided for the filing of such applications. Therefore, since Mr.
Judd failed to file his Petition for Post Conviction Relief within the
relevant time frame, that petition is barred.
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(Notice of Intent to Dismiss, filed 4/9/08, p.5.) The district court's subsequent
order of dismissal reaffirmed the futility of Judd's petition:
On May 5, 2008, this Court signed an Order dismissing the
Petition as Petitioner had not responded to the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss.
On May 8, 2008, Petitioner filed a Motion to Extend Time
frame which was granted by this Court and Petitioner was given
until July 8, 2008, to respond.
Petitioner thereafter filed an Affidavit and Motion for the
appointment of counsel which this Court considered and herewith
DENIES the appointment of counsel.
Petitioner filed a response to Notice to Dismiss and this
Court concludes it does not have jurisdiction to consider
Defendant's allegations as his Petition was not filed timely.
(Order, filed 7/3/08, pp.1-2 (emphasis added).)
On appeal, Judd does not assert his post-conviction petition was filed
timely.

Rather, he argues that the district court erred by failing to rule on his

motion for appointment of counsel prior to dismissing his post-conviction petition.
In his appellate brief, Judd cites and relies upon part of a sentence in
Charboneau, quoting, "[a]t a minimum, the trial court must carefully consider the
request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the substantive merits of the
petition." 4 Appellant's brief, p.7; cf. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at
1111. However, it is clear from the very language of the district court's order that
it had already "considered" Judd's motion for counsel prior to dismissing Judd's
petition.

(Order, filed 7/3/08, p.2 (Judd filed affidavit and motion for "the

4

The sentence quoted by Judd from Charboneau fully reads: "A court must
carefully consider the request for counsel, before reaching a decision on the
substantive merits of the petition and whether it contains new and admissible
evidence." Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111.
7

appointment of counsel which this Court considered and herewith DENIES .... "
(emphasis added).) Judd's contention that the district court failed to consider his
request for counsel prior to dismissing his petition is not supported out by the
record.
Nor has Judd presented any authority to support his contention that postconviction courts are precluded from making an express ruling in regard

to a

motion for appointment of counsel within the same written order that denies postconviction relief.

Such a rule would be hyper-technicaI5 and would go much

further than necessary to remedy the problem found in Charboneau -- where the
district court had dismissed the post-conviction petition without making any ruling
on Charboneau's motion for appointment of counsel. Charboneau, 140, Idaho at
792,102 P.3d at 1111.
Moreover, the dismissal of Judd's post-conviction petition was inevitable

regardless of whether his motion for appointment of counsel was granted; thus,
he cannot demonstrate any prejudice in the district court's ruling. In Swisher v.
State, 129 Idaho 467, 470-471, 926 P.2d 1314, 1317-1318 (Ct. App. 1996), the
Idaho Court of Appeals examined a similar situation as here, and ruled:
It is thus apparent that Swisher's alleged claims for postconviction relief were time-barred more than a year before his
application was filed. The action is therefore frivolous. Swisher's
counsel on appeal has not identified any steps that could have
been taken by an attorney, if counsel had been appointed to
represent Swisher before the trial court, that might have prevented
5

If the rule suggested by Judd were adopted, an order denying a request for the
appointment of counsel would be proper if it was filed a day before an order to
dismiss the post-conviction petition. In cases where, as here, the two rulings
were contained in the same order, a reversal and remand to cure such alleged
defect would merely result in a staggered filing of separate orders.
8

dismissal of this action. After having independently reviewed the
record, we can perceive no substantial rights of Swisher that were
or might have been impaired by the trial court's oversight in failing
to make a timely ruling on Swisher's request for counsel.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's failure to consider
Swisher's motion for appointed counsel before dismissing his action
was harmless error.
As was true in Swisher, there was nothing an attorney could have done in
Judd's case to make his post-conviction petition timely, or to excuse its
untimeliness. Judd attempted to excuse the late filing of his petition by asserting
his three ineffective assistance of counsel claims were, in essence, based upon
newly discovered evidence.

(R., p.15 (alleging he learned of trial counsel's

failures during a meeting with a local contract attorney in January of 2007, "and
that is why the petitioner has waited as long as he has to file this motion").) A
free review of Judd's petition shows he has not alleged facts that raise the
possibility of a valid claim. 6 In Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 191, 30 P.3d
967, 969 (2001 ), the Idaho Supreme Court made clear, "There is no discovery
exception in I.C. § 19-4902, .... I.C. § 19-4902 expressly limits a party's time to
bring a claim for post-conviction review to one year."7 In Schwartz

6

v. State, 145

Although the district court did not specifically address Judd's explanation for
the untimely filing of his post-conviction claims, it implicitly rejected Judd's
excuse. See State v. Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986)
(The implicit findings of the trial court should be overturned only if not supported
by substantial evidence); State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644
(Ct. App. 1998) ("[A]ny implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial
evidence should be given due deference.").
7
I.C. § 19-4209(a) states in relevant part: An application may be filed at any
time within one ( 1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following
an appeal, whichever is later.
9

Idaho 186, 189, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008), the court of appeals
explained:
The statute of limitation for post-conviction actions provides that an
application for post-conviction relief may be filed at any time within
one year from the expiration of the time for· appeal or from the
determination of appeal or from the determination of a proceeding
following an appeal, whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902(a). The
appeal referenced in that section means the appeal in the
underlying criminal case. Freeman [v. State], 122 Idaho [627] at
628, 836 P.2d [1088] at 1089 [(Ct. App. 1992)]. The failure to file a
timely application is a basis for dismissal of the application. Sayas
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003).
However, if an initial post-conviction action was timely filed and has
been concluded, an inmate may file a subsequent application
outside of the one-year limitation period if "the court finds a ground
for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted or
was inadequately raised in the original, supplemental, or amended
application." I.C. § 19-4908. See also Charboneau v. State, 144
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007).
Consequently, and as the district court implicitly recognized, Judd's postconviction petition was untimely and appointed counsel could not have done
anything to counter that fact. Because Judd's post-conviction claims are barred
procedurally they are also frivolous, and Judd was not entitled to appointment of
counsel to pursue those claims.

See Swisher, 129 Idaho 467, 470, 926 P.2d

1314, 1317 (Ct. App. 1996) (post-conviction petition procedurally barred,
petitioner's action was frivolous, and any error in failing to appoint counsel was
harmless). Judd has failed to demonstrate any error or possible prejudice in the
district court's order denying his motion for the appointment of counsel and
dismissing his post-conviction petition.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order denying
Judd's request for post-conviction counsel and dismissing his petition for postconviction be affirmed.
DATED this 23 rd day of December 2008.

C. McKINNEY
y Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23 rd day of December 2008, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
HEATHER M. CARLSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

John . McKinney
Dep y Attorney General
JCM/pm
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